By Alan Thomas
Книга Bernard Williams Bernard Williams Книги Психология, философия Автор: Alan Thomas Год издания: 2007 Формат: pdf Издат.:Cambridge college Press Страниц: 238 Размер: 1,5 ISBN: 0521662168 Язык: Английский0 (голосов: zero) Оценка:This quantity presents a scientific review and finished evaluate of Bernard Williams's contribution to ethical philosophy, a box during which Williams used to be essentially the most influential of latest philosophers. The seven essays, which have been particularly commissioned for this quantity, research his paintings on ethical objectivity, the character of sensible cause, ethical emotion, the critique of the "morality system," Williams's evaluation of the moral considered the traditional international, and his later adoption of Nietzsche's approach to "genealogy."
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Extra info for Bernard Williams
Well, they are incompatible in the sense that the concepts involved must lead their own separate and independent lives. 31 What may require long-term active participation and commitment is, not upholding the selected conceptualization in a way that downplays the other, which is something we have no reason to do, but upholding the selected conceptualization in a way that prevents interference 30 31 Quine (1990), p. 100. This does not rule out the possibility of combining the concepts by brute aggregation – that is, by ﬁrst producing a representation in accord with one conceptualization, then conjoining a representation in accord with the other – although sectarians, of course, will deny even that possibility.
THE ABSOLUTE CONCEPTION If the conclusion of Williams’ argument is to teach us anything, we need to be clear about what that conclusion is. 12 My list was meant as a safeguard against various possible misconstruals of Williams’ position, many of which I take to be actual. I shall not rehearse that list in full now. But I do want to draw attention to one item on the list that is especially pertinent to this discussion. 13 Talk of “the” absolute conception encourages this idea. But there is nothing in Williams to preclude the thought that, if we are to represent things from no point of view, then we shall be involved in continual decisions between various incompatible but equally legitimate conceptualizations; that these decisions may be highly parochial, in that they may be tailored to certain context-speciﬁc needs and interests of ours; that they may be hardearned, in that they may involve us in intensive conceptual and empirical 10 11 12 13 See esp.
For (part of) the signiﬁcance of this distinction, see further later, esp. n. 56. 11:22 P1: SBT 9780521662161c01K CUNY946/Thomas 34 978 0 521 66216 1 July 11, 2007 A. W. Moore incompatible point of view true. So the conception cannot itself be from any point of view. 39 We can now see why social worlds are thought to furnish different points of view in a way in which scientiﬁc conceptualizations do not. The idea is this. Given two scientiﬁc systems of the world, of the sort considered in the previous section, there is no impediment to using the conceptual resources of one to indicate (non-reductively) what makes the other true; nor to using this indication of what makes the other true in giving an account of how the two systems cohere.