By Patrick Lee
This e-book treats the query of what a human individual is and the moral and political controversies of abortion, hedonism and drug-taking, euthanasia, and intercourse ethics. It defends the location that humans are either physique and soul, with a basic and morally very important distinction from different animals. It defends the conventional place at the so much arguable particular ethical and political problems with the day.
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Extra resources for Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics
So such an inclination to have such thoughts does not provide strong warrant for them. For suppose there is psychological continuity after one of these fictional brain-state-transfer procedures (or teletransportations). And suppose that the thinker thinks that he exists, he now seems to have a new body, and, as a consequence, he is identical with the person he remembers himself as being. Such an inference would be without foundation. While the thinker with the transferred brain states, or transplanted 41 42 43 The position that in effect denies any synchronic identity for substances – sometimes called “four dimensionalism” or “perdurantism” – is examined later, see pp.
The changing of the apple from green to red and myriad other changes are evident to our senses and prompt us to ask why and to formulate hypotheses or theories to provide explanation for such changes. And we obviously undergo and bring about changes in ourselves – the reader right now is experiencing some type of change, whether pleasant or unpleasant, enlightening or disappointing. Thus, the perdurance theory, or temporal parts theory, has grave difficulties. But the psychological continuity view requires the perdurance theory, and so its serious difficulties are also grave problems for the psychological continuity view.
We are here supposing that the formation of water is a substantial change, in the Aristotelian sense, that is, the generation of a new substance. If that is not so, a similar example could be drawn from organisms: a spermatozoon can penetrate an ovum only if the chemical composition is just right in the vaginal tract of the female; if the chemical composition is changed very slightly, penetration by the spermatozoon of the ovum will be rendered impossible and thus a new substance will not come to be.